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Financingthe PostwarHousing Boom
in Phoenix and Los Angeles,1945-1960
LYNNE PIERSON DOTI AND
LARRY SCHWEIKART
LynnePiersonDoti is a memberofthe
economicsdepartmentat Chapman College and
LarrySchweikartis a memberofthe
ofDayton.
historydepartmentin the University

Real-estate booms have occurred regularly in the
American past and played an importantrole in the settlement of both rural and urban areas.' AfterWorld War II,
Americans experienced a general migration fromrural to
urban and suburban areas and fromthe Midwest and East to
the so-called "Sunbeltstates,"particularlyFlorida, Texas, Arizona, and California. California and Arizona both grew by
more than a hundred percent between 1945 and 1960, and
LarrySchweikartwishesto acknowledgefinancialsupportreceivedfromthe
ResearchInstituteof the Universityof Dayton,the Charles Redd Centerfor
WesternStudies,and theEarhartFoundation.
1. Materialon land boomsappearsin VernonCarstensen,ed., ThePublic

Lands (Madison, 1963); Douglass North, The Economic Growthof the United
States,1790-1860(Englewood Cliffs,N.J., 1961); North, Growthand Welfarein the

Past(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.,1966);Paul Wallace Gates,"The Role of
American

the Land Speculator in Western Development," PennsylvaniaMagazine ofHistory

and Biography,
LXVI (1942),314-333;Allan and MargaretBogue, "Profitsand
the FrontierLand Speculator,"JournalofEconomicHistory,
XVII (1957),1-24;
PacificHistorical Review ? 1989bythe PacificCoast Branch AmericanHistorical Association
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twocitiesthatreflectedthisphenomenal increase were Phoe-

nix and Los Angeles.Bothsharedmorethansunshine.Dur-

ing the war they had supported numerous defense workers
and thousands of militarypersonnel,many of whom passed
throughthe two citieson theirway to the front.The G.I. bill,
with its offerof inexpensive financingand low down paymentsforhousing,persuaded newcomersto stay,and earlier
visitorsto returnand buy homes-homes thatcould be built
and sold inexpensively because Phoenix and Los Angeles
possessed large parcels of agriculturalland suitable forconversion to mass-producedtractsof housing. Both cities had
automobile-basedtransportationsystemsin place by World
War II, and developers no longerhad to depend upon public
transit facilities to entice buyers. Although scholars have
describedthe urban growthof Phoenix and Los Angeles during thefifteen
yearsfollowingWorldWar II, theyhave largely
financial
the
ignored
arrangementsthat supported the residential boom in the two cities.2A review of the real estate
marketfrom1945to 1960reveals thatbanks and otherfinanMiltonHeath, Constructive
Liberalism
(Cambridge,Mass., 1954);JohnKenneth
Galbraith,The GreatCrash(Boston,1955);and RichardSylla,"Federal Policy,
Banking, Market Structureand Capital Mobilizationin the United States,
1863-1913,"Journalof EconomicHistory,XIX (1969), 659-686;Gene Smiley,
"InterestRate Movementsin the UnitedStates,1888-1913,"ibid.,XXV (1975),
591-620;and JohnJames,"The Developmentof the National Money Market,
1893-1911,"ibid.,XXXVI (1976),878-897.Land booms in the nineteenthcentury,as well as speculativeactivityin Florida in the twentieth
century,were
the
In
of
credit.
these
was supplied
credit
booms,
shaped by
availability
early
mostlyby the federalgovernment,railroad companies,or individualswho
made financing
availableas an adjunctto thesale ofpropertytheyhad acquired
in anticipation
oftheboom.Organizedfinancialinstitutions
generallydeveloped
afterthespeculativefeverhad cooled.
2. For backgroundon the growthof Phoenix and Los Angeles, see
BradfordLuckingham,
"The Cityin theWestward
Movement:A Bibliographical
Note," WesternHistoricalQuarterly,
V (1974), 305; Luckingham, The UrbanSouthwest:A ProfileHistoryofAlbuquerque,El Paso, Phoenix,and Tucson(El Paso, Tex.,

1982); GeoffreyP. Mawn, "Phoenix,Arizona: CentralCityof the Southwest,
1820-1920" (Ph.D. dissertation,Arizona State University,1979); Michael
ArizonaState
Kotlanger,
Jr.,"Phoenix,Arizona:1920-1940"(Ph.D. dissertation,
University,1983); JohnathanKandell, "Historians of West Are Shedding
'Cowboy'Image and GainingAcceptance,"New YorkTimes,Oct. 15,1972;D. W.
Meinig, Southwest:Three Peoples in Geographic Change, 1600-1970(New York,

Old and New (Lincoln,Neb., 1961);
1971); W. Eugene Hollon, The Southwest:

Kirkpatrick Sale, Power Shift:The Rise oftheSouthernRim and Its Challengeto the

EasternEstablishment
(New York,1975); Carl Abbott,"The AmericanSunbelt:
Idea and Region,"Journal
XXVIII (1979),7,8; and Abbott,TheNew
oftheWest,
UrbanAmerica: Growthand Politicsin SunbeltCities(Chapel Hill, 1982).
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of the rapid real-estate
cial institutionswere in the forefront
expansion and thatthis expansion had a profoundeffecton
these institutions.3
Real estate financingfollowingthe war came primarily
fromthreetypesoffinancialinstitutions
-commercial banks,
and
loan
and
insurance
savings
companies,
companies--with
the firsttwo playing by farthe most importantrole. Savings
and loan associations-mutual savings associationsin which
members (depositors) owned all the shares--specialized in
timedeposits and makingreal estate
holding interest-paying
loans. Commercial banks were publicly held corporations
that specialized in demand deposits (checking accounts on
which interestpaymentswere not allowed from1934to 1980)
and consumerand business (commercial)loans. Commercial
banks charteredby the federalgovernmentwere restrictedin
theirabilityto lend on real estate,but Californiaand Arizona
did not place similar restrictionson their state-chartered
banks.At various times,commercialbankswithstatecharters
were active lenders in these markets.Insurance companies
used accumulated premiumsto purchase loans fromthe primary lenders and also made constructionloans directlyto
developers. Although in Los Angeles savings and loan associations (S&Ls) played a major role in financingresidential
growth,in Phoenix new banks created the initial development spark, and S&Ls and other nonbank financial institutions lured buyerswitheasy credit.Insurance money,mostly
fromfirmsheadquartered in the East, was importantin both
Arizona and California.4
3. BradfordLuckingham,"Phoenix:The DesertMetropolis,"in Richard
Bernardand BradleyRice, eds., SunBeltCities:Politicsand Growth
SinceWorld
WarII (Austin,1983),309-327;Remi Nadeu,LosAngeles:FromMissiontoModern
City(New York,1960),59, 73. On Huntington,see WilliamFriedricks,
"Henry
in SouthernCalifornia,1898Huntingtonand MetropolitanEntrepreneurship
1917"(Ph.D. dissertation,
UniversityofSouthernCalifornia,1986).
4. Secondarysourceson bankingin Arizonaand Californiaare foundin
LarrySchweikartand Lynne Pierson Doti, "Bankingin the West:A BibliographicalIntroduction,"in Schweikart,ed., Bankingin the West(Manhattan,
Kan., 1984),88-94.During theearlydevelopmentofAmericanbanks,as well as
thosein Europe,real-estatelendingposed too greata riskforfinancialinstitutions.Savingsand loan associations,originallycalled buildingand loan socieof saverswho pooled theirfundsto
ties,startedas cooperativearrangements
build the members'homes.These societieswere oftenconvertedto financial
and by 1940savingsand loan associationsspecializedin real-estate
institutions,
lendingand savingsdeposits.
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In Phoenix, commercial bankers promoted and fueled
the real estatemarket.Moreover,theyengaged in boosterism
and encouraged outsidersto move to the area as much as real
estate brokersand developers did. The firmsthat captured
the new mortgagebusiness were small, new entrepreneurial
banks thatoperated in competitionwiththe establishedbanking "oligopoly."The successof thesebanksrevealed the openness of financialmarkets.Although theystill had to obtain a
charter,therewere fewbarriersto entry,especially since the
larger banks had failed to recognizethe potentialof the real
estateand mortgagemarkets.A similarshiftin financialpower
occurred in the Los Angeles area. Commercial banks, once
active lenders in the real estatemarket,lost a large share of
this business to the more aggressivepromotioneffortsof the
burgeoningsavings and loan industry.
Arizona's population growthbegan in earnest following
World War II, picking up momentumin the 1950swith the
widespread use of air conditioners.Virtuallyall of the population and business growthfrom 1946 to 1960 occurred in
Phoenix and Tucson, withthe formerspurtingpast its southern neighborto become one of the largestcitiesin the Southwest. Phoenix's population quadrupled to over 439,000,its
manufacturingoutputsoared by almost 1,500percent,and its
incorporated area grew elevenfold. The city's economic
growth,togetherwith the natural beauty and healthfulclimate,pulled in still others-mostly professionals,engineers,
and technicians.5
Among the biggestattractionswas affordablereal estate.
Young Arizona developers such as John F. Long, Del Webb,
Ralph Staggs,John Hall (Hallcraft Homes), Sam and Jack
Hoffman(F & S Construction),and David Murdock tapped
5. Michael Konig, "Postwar Phoenix, Arizona: Banking and Boosterism,"
Journal of the West,XXIII (1984), 72-76. See also Schweikart, "Collusion or
Competition? Another Look at Banking in Arizona's Boom Years," Journalof
Arizona History,XXVIII (1987), 189-200; Schweikart, A History of Banking in
Arizona (Tucson, 1982), 115-147; Michael Konig, "Toward Metropolis Status:
Charter Government and the Rise of Phoenix, Arizona, 1945-1960" (Ph.D.
dissertation,Arizona State University,1983).
The term "Phoenix" refers to the "Valley of the Sun," Phoenix and its
metropolitan area. Because of rapid expansion and annexation the term varied
even in officialdefinitions,but in 1960 would include most suburbs.
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intheearly1950s.
While
market
intothegrowing
construction
Long, Hall, Staggs,and the Hoffmanbrothersconcentrated
on residentialhousing, Webb and Murdock worked on skyscrapers,hotels, and officebuildings. Realtors such as Russ

in "selling"
thestatein theearly
Lyonactively
participated

1960s.Afterthe war the only restrictionon Arizona'sgrowth
was cool air and ready cash. Air conditionerssolved the first
problem, but Arizona's depression-toughenedbanks could
not supply enough creditto turnthe tremendouspotentialof
Phoenix into a marketable community.It was the federal
government that provided the resources to generate this
credit.6
Much of Washington'sinterestin the statebegan during
the war. Given the number of new and expanded military
bases, housing was in shortsupply while the conflictraged,
and the federal governmentclassifiedthe stateas a "critical
housing area," permittingArizona developers to build when
other areas of the countrywere denied the privilege. This
availability of housing led promotersin the 1950s to note
that,when industrialrecruiters"advertisedforskilled laborers in two locations simultaneously,the ratio of those who
preferredArizona to anotherlocation was between5 to 1 and
8 to 1."7
Valley National Bank, headquartered in Phoenix and
under the leadership of Walter and Carl Bimson, brought
governmentcredit into the state via another route, Federal
Housing Administrationloans, whichdated back to 1934and
the passage ofthe National Housing Act.Carl, who was instrumental in lobbyingforthe legislation,in 1935took over the
promotionof housing and real estatein Arizona. He "made a
crusade of it, organizingcrewsto ring doorbells and talk up
loans." In 1958 alone, constructionpermits in Tucson rose
6. Harold Martin, "The New Millionaires of Phoenix," SaturdayEvening
Post, Sept. 30, 1961, pp. 25-30 (quotation from p. 30); Schweikart, That Quality
Image: The Historyof ContinentalBank (Tappan, N.Y., 1988). Other material on
Continental Bank appears in the Archives of Continental Bank (hereaftercited
as CB Archives), Chase Bank of Arizona, Scottsdale, Ariz.
7. Larry Schweikart,interview with Carl Bimson, March 25, 1980, p. 1, in
taped interview collection, Arizona State University Library (hereaftercited as
ASUL), Phoenix.
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324percent.
ThatsameyearPhoenixissuedmorethanten

thousandbuilding permits.Valley Bank made $400,000worth
of FHA-related mortgagesin a single year,and over the same
period the bank also invested$600,000in uninsured loans in
the Phoenix market.The stateas a whole exceeded its FHA
quota of $3 million in loans. From 1934to 1945,Valley Bank
alone made over 198,000loans and had reached a national
rankingof fifthin originatingFHA loans in 1935.8 By 1945,
Valley Bank held so many FHA loans thatit could not make
any more and still maintain a permissible loan-to-reserves
ratio; thus,it attemptedto brokerthe loans to thirdparties.
When Transamerica,a large financialholding companythat
operated in five statesat that time,purchased $1 million of
the loans, Valley Bank advertised that it had an additional
$1 million to lend locally. The real boom, however, still
lay ahead.9
In 1947a small Phoenix insuranceagency,theA. B. Robbs
Agencies,received a phone call fromJackR. Smith,the West
Coast investmentrepresentativeofNational Life ofVermont.
Smith was seeking an Arizona correspondentto originate
FHA and VeteransAdministration
loans,whichwerefederally
in
insured loans to assist veterans
obtaining home loans.
Although A. B. Robbs, Sr., wanted nothing to do with any
governmentagencyforideological reasons,his son, A. B., Jr.,
immediatelyrecognized the potential for a program of this
type. One hurdle had to be cleared. To originateFHA loans,
the Robbs companyhad to have a networthof $100,000,but it
was capitalized at only halfthatamount.National Life solved
the problem by appointing the Arizona firm its mortgage
loan correspondent,thus guaranteeing the minimum net
worth.Between 1947 and 1950the Robbs company acquired
8. Ibid.; Schweikart interview with Bimson, April 7, 1980, ibid; Bimson
speech, Oct. 1952, in "Speeches of Carl Bimson," 127-136, unpublished collection at Valley National Bank, Phoenix; "Condensed Financial Statement" of
National Bank for year ending 1939, ibid. Residential housing starts for the
greater Phoenix area in 1954 and 1959 were, respectively,8,910 and 17,903.For
the same dates in the Los Angeles area, the housing starts were 104,082 and
1889-1964(WashStatistics,
90,269. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Housing Construction
ington, D.C., 1966), 108, 123.
9. Schweikart, Bimson interview,March 25, 1980, pp. 4-5, ASUL; Ernest
Hopkins, FinancingtheFrontier(Phoenix, 1950), 248.
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the accountsof eight other easterninvestors,who purchased
more than $12 million in FHA/VA mortgages.In addition to
initiatingthe loans, the Robbs agency collected the mortgages fromlocal households for a service fee. In the case of
refinancing,the firmdealt with the tedious and confusing
problemsof sortingout the paperwork.Because each eastern
investorwas involved withthousandsofcontractsin a distant
state,the Robbs Agencies filled an importantand profitable
functions.10The
niche by providingthesemortgage-servicing
volume of business conducted by this single firmwas large
not only forArizona,but also in comparisonto otherSunbelt
states. In 1947,the Robbs firm alone did a third as much
residentialreal-estatebusiness as all the banks in Oklahoma
combined.
Gradually, the Robbs Agencies expanded into mortgage
banking, and had the added business of insuring each new
house that it financed.By 1950 the company had reached a
level of $100,000net worthand obtained a charteras an FHAapproved mortgagee in its own right,therebyenabling the
firmto sell the mortgagesit originatedto numerous companies approved by the FHA. It thenexpanded into theTucson
marketas an independentbut affiliatedcompany--Newell &
Robbs, Mortgage Bankers.
In 1958,the A. B. Robbs Agencies became A. B. Robbs
Trust Company, with powers similar to a commercial bank,
including the privilege of acceptingdeposits and making all
varieties of loans. Its growing FHA-mortgage-generating
capacitycoincided withthe appointmentof a mortgagelending officerat Valley Bank whose "abrasive and opinionated"
attitudehad driven many of the young builder-developers
away fromthatbank and into the officesof the A. B. Robbs
TrustCompany.11
Even more importantto the growthof Robbs's mortgage10. Schweikart,
withA. B. Robbs,Jr.,June27,1985,CB Archives;
interview

A. B. Robbs Company minute books, box 6, A. B. Robbs, Jr.,Papers, ibid.
11. Schweikart interview with Ruby Nelson, tape in CB Archives, June
24, 1984; Schweikart, That QualityImage, 6. A trustcompany invested in various
assets, including mortgages, on behalf of its customers. Trust companies also
packaged mortgages and provided investors with bonds or with shares of the
trustitself.
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thanthedevelopers'
withValdisaffection
lendingcapacity
Bank
and
the
disinterest
of
the
other
banks
wasthe
ley
major
firm's
accesstogreatamounts
ofmortgage
capitalinthehands
ofeasterninvestors.
Robbs,Jr.,personally
soughtoutthese
tedious
toNewYorkin
investors,
making
twenty-hour
flights
uncomfortable
DC-9s.Relying
on
footwork
andsalespurely
Robbs
in
locatedlikelyprospects thephonebook,
manship,
madeappointments
withthem,and soldthemon Arizona.
He arrived
atexclusive
with
Hancock
Mutual
agreements
John
LifeInsurance
Paul
Revere
Life
InsurTravelers,
Company,
anceCompany,
anda hostofEastCoastandMidwest
savings
banks.Amongthesesavingsinstitutions,
theWilliamsburgh
Bank,Seamen's
Bank,People'sSavings
Bank,
Savings
Savings
andBowery
Bankformed
a NewYorkbasethatserved
Savings
Bank(whichtheRobbsTrustCompany
Continental
became
in 1964)tothepresent.
Thesesecondary
market
sources
had,
million
$30
worth
of
Arizona
by 1953,purchased
mortgages
a fertileinvestment
(Table 1). The Southwest
represented
fieldforhomemortgages
thatbecameincreasingly
difficult
to obtainin theEast,bothbecauseofhigherproperty
costs
andbecauseofthegrowing
attraction
ofSunbelt
cities.12
As easterncapitalfunnelled
intoArizona,thehousing
boomreacheditspostwar
Phoenix
rankedeleventh
in
peak.
thenationin 1958with16,200newdwellingunits,almost
doublethenumber
in 1956.As seenin Table2,
constructed
all ofthePhoenixconstruction
consisted
ofsinglevirtually
unithomes,notapartments,
the
that
indicating
mortgage
boom.Ofthenew
moneycontributed
heavilytothehousing
in MaricopaCounty,
construction
ofwhichPhoenixis the
hub,theA. B. RobbsTrustCompanycommanded
twenty
ofthetotalmortgage-loan
market
fornewhousing.
percent
Robbs-related
recorded
more
companies
mortgages
totaling
than$2.5millionin May1959alone.'3
nonresidential
conManyoftheRobbsTrustCompany's
12. Schweikart,
ThatQualityImage,8-10.ContinentalmergedwithChase
in 1985,and is now Chase Bank.
13. See A. B. RobbsTrustCompany,"Dispatch,"June1959,CB Archives.
Pima County,in whichTucson is located,also grew,but at less spectacular
rates;buildingpermitsrose from3,303in 1956to 4,206in 1958.
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Table 1. A. B. Robbs Company:OutstandingPrincipalBalances
as of the December, 1953, Closings
$ 2,798,776.64
5,759,310.13
305,832.82
572,193.78
3,225,275.86
653,591.61
101,041.26
737,255.36
1,385,954.90
1,156,181.71
2,792,402.70
3,816,310.99
210,039.94
2,969,948.12
789,875.94
292,288.01
584,053.61
1,258,573.54
716,564.64
70,949.74

National Life of Vermont
John Hancock Mutual Life
Kansas City Life
Paul Revere Life
Brooklyn Savings Bank
City Savings Bank
Columbia National Life
Dollar Savings Bank
Eastchester Savings Bank
East River Savings Bank
Erie County Savings Bank
Federal National Mortgage Association
Greater New York Savings Bank
Greenwich Savings Bank
American Irving Savings Bank
Massachusetts Protective Association
New Hampshire Savings Bank
People's Savings Bank
Philadelphia Savings & Loan Society
Half-Dime Savings Bank

$30,196,421.30

20 investors

Source: A. B. Robbs Company ledger

Table 2.

Type of Housing Structures,1954-1960
(in thousandsof units)
Phoenix

Los Angeles

Year

1 unit

2-4

5 or more
units

1 unit

2-4

5 or more
units

1954
1959
1960

8.2
13.3
N/A

0.4
2.0
N/A

0.2
2.5
N/A

78.2
47.3
40.4

7.1
8.1
7.2

1.8
34.7
34.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Housing Construction
1899-1964
Statistics,
(Washington, D.C., 1966), 108, 123.
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struction loans went to developer David Murdock. After
receiving a loan fromValley Bank that pulled him out of
early financial troubles,Murdock again returnedto Robbs
for funds for "multimillion-dollarredevelopmentof whole
downtownblocks."By 1961he had constructednineteenoffice
buildings in Phoenix, including the city'sfirstskyscraperof
significance(the Guaranty Bank Building), and in the process had borrowed $20 million, mostlythroughRobbs Trust
Company financing.'4
While the A. B. Robbs Trust Company was the most
active firmin both Phoenix and Arizona mortgagelending,
it was by no means the only one. JimPatrick,executivevicepresidentofthe Valley Bank, soughtto mend theriftbetween
Valley and the developers that had existed since the early
1950s.To repair the damage, he often"served as guide, counselor and financialbacker"to mostofthe developers,lending
to many of the same builders as Robbs. But Patrick'sbankunlike the Robbs Trust Company-did not have access to
eastern capital. In 1963, for example, the Robbs Company
had forty-nineeastern investorswhose principal balances
in the Robbs Trust Company totaled $228.6 million that
was used by the Arizona company to make FHA loans on
real estate. No other bank in the state could boast such
capitalization.15
Due to the potential gains in areas of development and
finance,yet to be tapped by either the A. B. Robbs Trust
Company or existing banks, Robbs had, during the early
1960s,joined developer David Murdock in an alliance to
create yet another financial entityspecificallydesigned to
handle all aspects of the real estate business, Financial Corporation of Arizona (FCA). FCA consisted of several firms
thatRobbs
mergedintoone broad financialservicesinstitution
called "the firstpublicly held, diversifiedfinancialholding
company in Arizona."It had thepotentialof expanding even
furtheruntil a vice-presidentembezzled more than $1 million, causing FCA to collapse.16
14. Martin, "New Millionaires," 20.
15. Ibid.; Continental Bank, "Total Servicing," CB Archives.
16. Schweikart,That QualityImage, 13-14; SchweikartinterviewswithRobbs
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Still seeing other investmentopportunities,but dissatisfied with FCA, in 1964 Robbs opened his own bank, Continental National Bank. In addition to retaining all of the
original Robbs Trust Company accounts,Continental cultivated new relationshipswithbuilders and investors.George
Steinhilber took over the mortgage lending operations in
1964and assumed the difficultbut criticaltaskof cultivating
the eastern accounts and, in the process, assuming Robbs's
mantle of booster,promoting Phoenix as well as the trust
company.The Robbs Company'sconversionto a bank was in
many ways a forerunnerof modern deregulation, wherein
banks are permittedto enter mortgagelending to a greater
extent.17
While Robbs was the most importantof the Arizona financiers and boosters,therewere others.The Phoenix Chamber of Commerce recognized the value of an officialcity
"promoter"and named PatrickDowney,an executiveforValley Bank,to thatpost.He lobbied suchcompaniesas Motorola,
General Electric,and Sperry-Rand,alwayspresentingtarget
firmswith a dossier on Phoenix-which included maps, tax
information,labor statistics,and weatherreports-that sold
the city and the state as "especially conducive to technical
industrial growth."These professionals--technicians and
white-collarworkers--purchasedmuch of the new residential housing in the 1950s afterDowney, the chamber,and
Valley Bank had "advertised"to theiremployees the virtues
of the Sunbelt. At firstthe chamberof commercepurchased
Downey's servicesfromthe bank, but when its fundsbecame
inadequate, Valley Bank paid Downey's salary for his promotional work.FirstNational Bank also paid forindividuals
to workon behalfof the chamberofcommerce,thussubsidizing boosterismforthe cityand state.Through bank-sponsored
and LilymaePenton,July19, 1985,CB Archives;ArchieKleven to Robbs,Jr.,
Aug. 12, 1963,folder24, box 2, A. B. Robbs,Jr.,Papers. Othermaterialwas
discussion that Schweikarthad with David
provided in an off-the-record
Murdock,May 29, 1986. Robbs lost half a million dollars; Murdockbarely
avoidedbankruptcy,
butdoggedlyrebuilthis companyuntilit eventuallystood
as a nationalpowerhouseamongdevelopmentfirms.
17. Robbs interview;Schweikart,ThatQualityImage,14-23;A. B. Robbs,
Jr.,Papers,C. B. Archives;"Applicationto Organizea NationalBank,"folder
interviewwithGeorge Steinhilber,
1, box 13,ibid.;Schweikart
July2, 1985.
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publications such as ArizonaProgressand Arizona,the state's
banks encouraged residentialreal-estatesales by relatingsta-

tisticson publicschools,taxation,
labor,and employment

growth.'8
Thus, at the same time that great amounts of eastern
capital began to flood into Arizona,enticed by the successof
Valley Bank and the chamber'scampaign and thenfacilitated

by the A. B. Robbs TrustCompany,importantelements
of the Phoenix bankingcommunity
as a whole stimuated
demand, especiallyin Phoenix. And because theinterestrates
provided by the FHA/VA mortgages were favorable,consumershad furtherreason to increasetheirdemand forloans.

Once thelargecorporations
had movedintothePhoenix
area and begun profitableoperations,manyof theirengi-

neers and mid-level executives broke offto formtheir own

companies.Encouragingthemto do so and sustainingthe

real-estateboom was the availability of start-upcapital for
small businesses. Such financing had earlier been largely
ignored by local financial institutions.In 1963 the void was
filledby a small,highlyspecialized firm,Thunderbird Bank.
Sensing the change in local business patterns,its president,
RobertMcGee, shiftedthe bank's lending patternsto emphasize businesscreditinsteadofcommercialor agriculturalloans.
During thelate 1960sThunderbirdBank emergedas a leading
small-businessbank in the Southwestand encouraged other
lending institutionsto followits lead. By supplyingcreditto
local entrepreneurs,Arizona's banks also ensured that longtermgrowthwould succeed the short-term
boom.19
Arizona savings and loan companies also participatedin
the Phoenix land boom, with first-mortgage
loans growing
from$2.9 million to $92 million between 1946and 1960.Over
the same period, the numberof savingsand loans firmsgrew
from two to seven, and one company clearly led the way.
WesternSavings and Loan made more than half ($54.5 mil18. Transcript
ofan interview
withPatrickDowney,July8, 1978,Phoenix
HistoryProject,WesternSavingsBuilding,Phoenix; Konig, "PostwarPhoenix,"73.
19. On ThunderbirdBank, see Schweikart,
A DynamicLegacy:ThunderbirdBank,1964-1985
(Phoenix,1986).

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 17 Nov 2014 12:16:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Financingthe PostwarHousing Boom

lion) ofthefirstmortgageloans extendedby all S&Ls in 1960.20
Still, this involvement by S&Ls remained a small segment of the mortgagemarket;in 1953 the Robbs Company
alone loaned $30 million--some $7 million more than the
existingfivesavingsand loan companies combined. It is also
importantto note thatlittle"backflow"--thelending of California mortgage money to Arizona institutions
-occurred.
Had the California S&Ls been anxious to lend, theywould
have found local demand more than sufficient
forthe investment of theirfunds.The records of the Arizona banks indicate thatthe sourcesofall outside mortgagefundswere in the
eastern states.Likewise, the books show that none of Arizona's mortgagemoney was used to buy California mortgages
("relending"). In both Phoenix and Los Angeles the demand
forfinancingsoaked up all available local funds.
In contrastto the situation in Arizona, California commercial banks,and particularlythe smaller banks,were generally reluctantto extend credit to the real-estatemarket.
Although the amount that all commercial banks loaned on
mortgages as a percent of assets rose from 6.9 percent in
1945 to 20.7 percentin 1956,only a fewof the largestbanks
participated.The reluctanceof commercialbankersto meet
the needs of developers and homeownersresulted in a very
rapid growth in the number and size of savings and loan
associations in California and stimulated inflows of large
amountsof mortgagemoney throughnational lifeinsurance
companies.21
California's postwar growthwas also accelerated by the
militaryconcentrationsand the defense and service industriesthatarrivedduringthewar.The population soared from
6.9 million in 1940 to 10.6 million in 1950. Los Angeles
20. Arizona Banking Dept., Annual Reports(Phoenix, 1946-1960).
21. Richard Towey and Robert Lindsay, "Liquidity of California Banks,"
in Hyman Minsky,ed., CaliforniaBankingin a GrowingEconomy,1946-1975(Berkeley, 1964), 143. It should be noted that,unlike in Arizona, many corporate and
bank archives in California are closed or restricted,and reports such as those
cited in Minsky's volume contain much of this restricted material. Primary
sources, in these cases, were not available to the authors. For other general
material on California, see Governor's Banking and Study Committee, On the
FutureofBankingin California(San Francisco, 1965).
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Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) included Orange County.
Orange County began to grow rapidly in the 1950s and was a separate Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (Anaheim/Santa Ana/Garden Grove) in the 1960
census. Growth in the SMSA was 225 percent between 1950 and 1960. The term
"Los Angeles area" refersto the pre-1960 definition.
23. Marquis James and Bessie James, Biographyof a Bank: The Storyof
Bank of America (New York, 1954), 417, 490; Federal Reserve Board of Gover1896-1969(Washington, D.C., 1965).
nors, FederalReserveBoard: All Bank Statistics,

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 17 Nov 2014 12:16:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Financingthe PostwarHousing Boom

ing for six thousand homes. Meanwhile, Henry Doegler
received $75 million fromthe bank fordevelopmentswestof
Los Angeles. But most commercial banks avoided developers, apparently sharing the pride of the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Los Angeles which boasted that it "rarely
made loans to subdividersand builders forthe development
of large tracts."24
There had been a briefflirtationwiththe mortgagemarketsby commercialbanks in the years 1946-1950,when banks
were holding over half of the institutionallyheld mortgage
debt in the state. Banks were particularlyattractedto the
federallyguaranteed mortgages,viewing them as a safe and
liquid investment.The large amountof savingsdepositsprovided a stable source of fundsforthis lending.25But even in
the early postwar period, when a few banks dominated the
primarymortgagemarket,thislargeamountofdepositsmeant
California banks as a group never approached the legal limits for real-estateloans in their portfolios.Federal statutes
allowed a charterednational bank to loan on real estateup to
sixtypercent of its time deposits, and government-insured
loans were excluded in makingthiscalculation.Statebanksthose charteredunder California law-had no limit on the
total amount of their investmentsthat they could devote to
real-estateloans. The generous ceilings, and very high volume of time deposits, which constitutednearly half of all
Californiabank depositsin the earlypostwarperiod, ensured
that few banks were constrainedby regulatoryrestrictions.
Los Angeles banks, for example, could have doubled their
total real-estateloans outstandingfor 1946-1951and stillnot
have exceeded federallimits.26
After1950,banks declined rapidly in importancerelative
24. James and James, Biographyof a Bank, 241, 470, 490; Robert Cleland
and Frank Putnam, Isaias Hellman and the Farmers and MerchantsBank (San
Marino, Calif., 1965), 102.
25. Frederic Morrissey, "The Allocation of Funds by the Commercial
Banks in the California Economy, 1946-1975," in Minsky,ed., CaliforniaBanking,
ResidentialMortgageLending
249; James Gilles and Clayton Curtis, Institutional
in Los Angeles County,1946-51: Six SignificantYears of Mortgage Lending (Los
Angeles, 1956), 66.
26. Federal Reserve Board, All Bank Statistics,150; Gillies and Curtis,
Institutional
ResidentialMortgageLending,70.
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moved into second place in the size of assets. A year later
California's growthrate was the fastestamong the states33 percentcomparedto 18percentnationwide.In 1954leaders
of the organizationregisteredcongratulationsand astonishmentwhen Californiasavingsand loan associationsincreased
theirassetsby another$512 million and reported$2.3 billion
in outstandingmortgages.27
The growthof the savings and loan industryin California continued throughoutthe 1950s. A 1960 report by the
StanfordResearchInstitutecalculatedthegrowthin new firms
over thedecade at 34 percent,thenumberofhome and branch
officesat 159 percent,and the growthrate in the number of
mortgageloans at 521 percent.Most of thisincreaseoccurred
in southernCalifornia; 65 percentof the assetsof the savings
and loan associationsin Californiain 1959were in theportfolios offirmsheadquartered in Los Angeles.28This aggressive
expansion by the savingsand loan industrydid not,however,
make the mortgagemarketindependent of the commercial
bankswheremuch largeroverall size continuedto make them
the largestholders of mortgages.
Still, the rising importanceof savings and loan associations did have a significantimpact on the mortgagemarket.
S&Ls were more willing than banks to lend in the "used"
housing marketwithabout half theirloans financingresales
ratherthan new construction.Builders and developers,especially in southernCalifornia,found savings and loans more
accommodatingthan banks.They provided more fundsfora
project and were more generous in their estimatesof the
borrower'scredit-worthiness.
Althoughtherewere large variations between individual savings and loan associations,an
overall shiftoccurredin theirpreferenceformore profitable
conventional loans rather than FHA or VA loans.29In the
1950sand 1960sthe S&Ls built a base of conventionalloans
using government-insuredloans primarilyas a liquid asset
since they could be easily convertedto cash. This liquidity
27. United States Savings and Loan League, Savingsand Loan Annals

(1946-1954); AnnualReportsoftheUnitedStatesSavingsand Loan League (1946-1954).
28. C. J. Clawson, F. W. Barsalow et al., The Savings and Loan Industryin

(SouthPasadena,Calif.,1960),pp. II, 2, 5.
California
29. Ned Eichler,TheMerchant
Builders(Cambridge,Mass., 1982),52-53.
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The growthofsavingsand loan associationsalso helped

change the distributionof time-and-demanddeposits in the
commercialbanks. From 1945to 1963the demand depositsof
Californiabanks grewfasterthan the national average. Prior

to deregulationin the 1970sand 1980s,financialinstitutions
couldnotpayinterest
on demanddeposits,buttheycoulddo
so on timedepositsand savingsaccounts.As a resultS&L
timedepositsincreasedby3,600percentwhilethoseofbanks
grew 350 percent."
Life insurance companies also attemptedto satisfythe
rising demand for mortgage money in California. In 1949,
national life insurance companies, holding over ninetypercent of the industry'stotal assets,received authorizationto
operate in California. From 1949to 1954theirproportionof
outstandingreal-estateloans in the state rose fromtwentynine percent to thirty-three
percent. By 1951 only thirtyof
the 200 life insurance companies doing business in the state
had made no mortgageloans. Although theirimportancein
the overall marketdeclined slightlyafter1954,the numberof
companies operating increased by seventy percent in the
1950s,and theirmortgageloans increased 319 percent.Thirteen percent of all real-estateloans made by life insurance
companies throughoutthe nation were withinCalifornia by
the end of the decade.31
Life insurance companies and savings and loan associationscompetedsuccessfully
withthecommercialbanksbecause
of the more liberal terms offeredto borrowers. Banks in
Californiawere limitedto twenty-four-year
loans forno more
than seventy-fivepercent of the property'sassessed valuation. The savings and loan associations could loan eighty
percentof the assessed value forup to twenty-five
years,and

30. Minsky, ed., California Banking, 110, 260, 267; Gillies and Curtis,
Institutional
ResidentialMortgageLending,47; Cox, "Institutional Mortgage Lending," 150.
31. Cox, "Institutional Mortgage Lending," 115-117.
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life insurance companies oftenextended even more lenient
terms.
In contrastto the banks in California,savings and loan
associationsand lifeinsurancecompanies also relied on funds
fromotherstatesto fuel the expanding real-estatemarket.In
the early years of the expansion, when banks dominated the
market,mostoftheirfundswere derived fromthe timedeposits of the rapidly growing local population. As the savings
and loan associations gained ascendancy in the early 1950s,
the timedepositsofcommercialbanksgrowmore slowly,and
many of their new loans were refinancingtransactionsassociated withthe resale ofexistinghomes. Virtuallynone ofthe
banks' sources of funds for real-estateloans came fromcustomersout of state.On the other hand, the savings and loan
associations came to depend increasingly on out-of-state
sources. In 1960,some 18.5percentof the fundsin California
savingsand loan depositscame fromresidentsin otherstates.
Life insurancecompanies importedseventy-sevenpercentof
theirfundsfromout of the state.32
Los Angeles and its suburbs magnified the trends that
characterized real-estatefinancing in the rest of the state.
Indeed, Los Angeles oftenset the trendin mortgagelending.
The population of Los Angeles County increased by fifty
percentbetween 1940and 1950,mostlythroughimmigration
workersand theirfamilies.The increase
of defense-industry
incomewas
of ninety-eight
percentin real(inflation-adjusted)
even more dramatic.33The Los Angeles area also had a patternof industrialdevelopment thathelped fuel the residential boom. Defense-relatedindustrieshad located in several
townsand citieswithinthe Los Angeles metropolitanareanotably Long Beach, San Pedro, Fontana, Seal Beach, and
Santa Ana. These areas all had large,open agriculturalfields
thatprovided suitable spots for"tracts"where fiftyto a hundred or more homes could be built at the same time. Thus,
tractsofhomesrapidlyreplacedbean fieldsand orangegroves.
The 1954 recession slowed Los Angeles's growthconsid32. Schaff, "Savings Function and Mortgage Investment," 254; Gillies
ResidentialMortgageLending,99-101.
and Curtis, Institutional
33. Minsky, "Commercial Banking," 121.
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erably,however,and shiftedbuilding activityinto multipledwelling units (apartments).Multi-unit dwellings shot up
much fasterin Los Angeles than in Phoenix from 1954 to
1960,especially after1955; the boom in single-familyhomes
beforethattimehad saturatedthe area withresidentialhomes
(Table 2). By 1950,fifty-six
percentof all residentialunits in
Los Angeles and its suburbs were owner-occupied,singlefamilybuildings. From 1946 to 1951 single-familyhomes in
the Los Angeles area increasedfifty-five
percent,about eightyfivepercentof thempurchased withborrowedfunds.34
As in Californiaoverall, banks had been the most importantsource formortgagefundsforLos Angeles and the suburbs from 1946 to 1949. Thereafter,however,the emerging
competitionfromthe savingsand loan industryand lifeinsurance companieswas even more dramatictherethanin therest
of the state.The amount of Los Angeles real-estatelending
by the savings and loan associations firstsurpassed that of
banks in 1949 and far exceeded it by 1951; life insurance
companies passed the commercialbanks in 1950(Table 3).
Table 3. SourceofResidential
MortgageLoansof $20,000or Less
in Los AngelesCounty($ millions)
Year

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951

Savingsand Loans

148
200
217
219
456
425

Banks LifeInsuranceCompanies

313
382
248
178
245
219

50
83
102
121
271
256

Source: James Gillies and Clayton Curtis, Institutional
ResidentialMortgage
YearsofMortgageLending (Los Angeles,
Lending,1946-1951:Six Significant
1956), appendix, table 7.

34. Gillies and Curtis, Institutional
ResidentialMortgageLending, 10-11. In
Arizona, the recession also struckthe real-estate industrybut the boosterism of
Arizona businesses, combined withthe expansion of air conditioning as a method
of cooling houses and commercial buildings, offsetsome of the recession-related
drop. This recession, however, had already convinced Robbs to diversifyhis
mortgage-lending operations into commercial banking.
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The intense demand forhousing in Los Angeles during
the entire period 1945-1960 meant that mortgage lenders
had considerable difficultyin attractinga sufficientvolume
offundsto loan out. Banks limitedtheirfund-raisingattempts
to solicitationsof local depositors,but savings and loan associationsfolloweda more aggressivecampaign. The payment
of high intereston time deposits was an importantway Los
Angeles S&Ls attractedmore funds.Interestrates(called dividends) on savings deposits in Los Angeles oftenexceeded
three percent during a period when the prevailing rate on
deposits in the rest of California was 2.5 to three percent.
With this incentive,Los Angeles savings and loan associations attracted7.2 percentof theirdeposits fromoutside the
metropolitanarea in 1951,and theyincreased thatfigureto
eighteenpercentby 1959.35
Life insurancecompanies also broughtfundsinto the Los
Angeles area. Almost half of their funds were outside the
area in 1955-1956. Overall, outside funds financed about
twentypercentof Los Angeles mortgagesin the 1950s,according to an estimateby John Cox. If the criterionforoutside
fundsis the locationoftheprincipalofficeoftheloan-granting
institution,the flowof fundsinto the area is even more pronounced; the Cox studyindicatedthatabout halfofthe mortgage loans in the early 1950s came from institutionswith
headquarters outside the Los Angeles area, although that
proportionhad declined to about a thirdby 1960.36
All Los AngelesCountyfinancialinstitutions
gained funds
fornew loans by selling the mortgagesin theirportfoliosto
the Federal National MortgageAssociation.In 1951a remarkable 23.5 percent of the $677 million of FHA and VA mortgages that this governmentagency bought nationwidewere
linked to Los Angeles properties.37
The California real-estateboom in the late 1940s produced lasting changes in the state'sfinancial industry.The
defense-relatedindustriesattractedlarge inflowsof people
35. Ibid., 59-60.

36. Cox, "Institutional
is
MortgageLending,"92, 101.Cox's information
based on surveydata thathas been closed to outsideresearchers.
37. Gillies and Curtis, Institutional
ResidentialMortgageLending, 194.
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fromotherstatesand stimulatedthe building industry.Local
banks,dependentupon theirsavingsdepositsto financeloans
on real estate,were unable to attractsufficient
fundsbecause
of the low interestthey paid to depositors. This weakness,
combined withfearsabout the risksassociatedwiththe possibilityof anotheroverblownland boom, led to theirdecreased
willingnessto lend on real estate.The position of the banks
in the real-estatemarketeroded in the 1950swhen savings
and loan associations and life insurance companies stepped
in to assume those added risks.Savings and loan associations
emerged as the dominantforcein the mortgagemarket,and
despite some deteriorationthereafter,
theyremained in that
mid-1980s.
the
position through
The real estate land boom of 1945 to 1960 also wrought
changes in the structureof financialinstitutionsin both Arizona and California.Whereasin Phoenix theboom had given
rise to new commercialbanksand fosteredpromotionalefforts
by the business and banking communityto encourage furthermigration,in Los Angeles the population was already in
place and little promotion was needed. Phoenix entrepreneurs and some bankerspursued both innovativefinancing
and advertisingplans -for example, Californiabankerswere
less creative (but Los Angeles savings and loan institutions
provided the innovativefinancingto fuel the boom). In both
locations the boom had the same impact on the major commercial banks: the existing giants lost marketshare to the
new and more flexible financial institutions.Both Phoenix
and Los Angeles witnessed inflowsof capital fromeastern
and midwesterninvestors,particularlyinsurancecompanies.
As a result,theeasternfinancialcentersunwittingly
sponsored
the growthof the veryregion that,by the 1980s,challenged
the economic, demographic, and political position of the
declining rustbelt.
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